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Background
The process of decentralisation in decision making has received increasing attention in 
the past few years. In transition economies the break-up of centralised decision-mak-
ing has required new systems of governance; in Eastern European and Latin American 
countries (Weisner 2003) more autonomy is demanded by lower tiers, even though its 
effects on economic growth and regional income disparities remain a controversial issue 
(Barrios and Strobl 2009; Sacchi and Salotti 2014; Sorens 2014); at EU level the discus-
sion on the functions that should be centralised is still open (Thieben 2003; Tanzi 2009; 
Vaubel 2009).
The nature of services produced and financed by the public sector is changing: nowa-
days most services provided are local impure public goods with spillovers.1 Examples are 
1 An impure public good is a commodity (or a service) that has the double characteristic of being an appropriable good 
(as private goods) and a public good. Let us for example consider education. Education improves utility of students in 
terms of future earnings/better working conditions (this is the private good element), but it also improves the utility of 
the community in terms of skilled workers/professionals available to society (this is the public good element).1 Another 
important class of impure public goods are the so called option goods, where the utility for society is derived from the 
availability of the good in case of need. A good example may be local transport. It produces utility for services users, but 
it improves also the utility of non users (hence of the whole community) in terms of being an available option in case of 
need (see Musgrave and Musgrave 1989).
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health care and education, local transport, sporting facilities, waste disposal. These ser-
vices generate utility directly to users (as private goods do), but also indirectly to non 
users (as local public goods do). Their beneficial effect is usually not confined to users in 
a specific jurisdiction and this why spillovers arise. According to OECD statistics, in 
2014 public expenditure for health, and education accounted for about 12.2 % of total 
GDP, in the US the share is even higher (OECD 2016).
For these services, there is no consensus in the literature on which is the most 
appropriate government tier to deliver the good.2 The institutional setting is quite 
heterogeneous among countries. Dziobek et al. (2011) examine the fiscal decentrali-
sation index for several countries and observe a large variation that does not simply 
depends on economic or geographical factors; for education Turati et al. (2011) show 
a quite heterogeneous picture, which is even greater for health and social care 
(Costa-Font and Greer 2013). In Alcidi et al. (2014) several measures of fiscal decen-
tralisation are studied for the European Union, showing that different decentralisa-
tion strategies have been adopted, even within the same country. For Europe as a 
whole fiscal decentralisation (defined as the ratio of local expenditure to total 
expenditure) is around 20 % for health 40 % for education and 80 % for environment 
protection. Some countries are below all these levels (Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Slovenia), a second group are above the average 
(Lithuania, Poland) while a third group of countries are well above the limit for some 
services and below for others.3
The reason for this observed heterogeneity is that the determination of the optimal 
quantity to be produced is more complex than for public goods. For the latter, the quan-
tity supplied and financed also represents the quantity consumed by all the individuals 
in the community. For impure public goods a pseudo demand exists, and Government 
should use indirect instruments (such as subsidises to the price) to match demand with 
supply and to produce the optimal quantity. However, the information necessary to 
achieve a First Best (FB) result is usually not accessible and only second best solutions 
can be attained.
The traditional literature on fiscal federalism (Oates 1972; Tresch 2002) argue that the 
allocation of functions between Central and local Governments should follow efficiency 
principles. Production should be assigned to the tier which is better informed on local 
preferences, while Central Government (CG) may use grants for equity and efficiency 
reasons. Second generation models4 suggest that the success of fiscal federalism 
depends on the information the agents possess about specific parameters (Akai and 
Mikami 2006; Levaggi 2002; Wildasin 2004; Snoddon and Wen 2003) and on the level 
of coordination in the actions of the different agents (Besley and Coate 2003; Köthen-
bürger 2008; Petretto 2000; Ogawa and Wildasin 2009). Both issues have been widely 
studied by the literature, which shows the existence of a trade-off between autonomy 
and control.
2 For a review of the debate see Oates (2005).
3 The Netherlands, for example have decentralised about 93 % of expenditure on environmental protection and virtu-
ally nothing as concerns health. On the contrary Denmark has almost fully decentralised health care, but only 60 % of 
expenditure on environmental protection.
4 See Oates (2005) for a review.
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In this article we compare centralisation (defined as the provision of goods at local 
level by CG) with devolution (defined as the provision of goods at local level by a local 
government) for the provision of an impure local public good with spillovers in an envi-
ronment characterised by asymmetry of information. We show that the traditional 
“devolution is always welfare improving” is valid only in the absence of spillovers. When 
they do exist, the gain in utility derived from devolution must be sufficiently high to 
compensate the welfare loss deriving from asymmetry of information and lack of coordi-
nation. In this setting, we derive the optimal grants-in-aid formula and compare it with 
what suggested by the literature for local public goods.
From a policy point of view, our paper may explain why some countries have preferred 
centralisation to devolution for the provision of services such as education and health 
care. Calsamiglia et al. (2006) argue that it may depend on altruism; in this article we 
show that efficiency may be the driving factor. For services whose comparative advan-
tage in being locally produced is limited, while their consumption produces spillovers, 
centralisation may be the second best choice.
The organisation of the paper is as follows: in “The model” the main features of the 
model and the FB are presented; in “Centralisation” the centralised solution is analysed, 
while in “Devolution” devolution is presented; they are then compared in “Centralisation 
versus devolution”; finally in “Conclusions” the conclusions are drawn.
The model
A country, whose population is normalised to one, is divided into two local authorities 
j ∈ {1, 2}, equal in everything but their preferences for the impure public good y.5 Each 
individual has an exogenous money income M in the range [M,M], whose distribution in 
each region has density function 12 f (M). Then, total income is:
and total income in local authority j equals Yj = 12Y . Income is used to buy private com-
modities and one or zero units of an impure local public good y, whose user charge is 
equal to pju. y is an impure public good, which means that it has a double effect on the 
utility function of each individual:
  • as a private commodity;
  • for the whole quantity that is produced.
Let us first consider the private characteristic. A good of quality θl produces an utility 
equal to αθ, where α is a taste parameter in the range (0,β), equally distributed among 
the population. Therefore, if the difference αθl − pju is positive the consumer buys y, oth-
erwise he does not buy the good and private utility is zero. To simplify the algebra, we 
assume that M > pju for all j, i.e. everybody can afford y.
5 We share this assumption with Wildasin (2001). In a more general setting, a reasonable assumption would be to 
assume that the two local authorities have a different average income. For the purpose of this analysis such assumption 






Page 4 of 23Levaggi and Levaggi  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:282 
The nature of impure public good means that the commodity y accrues utility to 
users and non users; in our model this characteristics is represented by the term 
zj(θl(Qj + k Q−j)), where
is the total quantity demanded in each community and Q−j is the quantity produced out-
side jurisdiction j. Let us examine each element: zj represents the relative importance 
that each community attaches to the public goods characteristic of y; the second impor-
tant element is the parameter k ∈ [0, 1], which captures spillovers and represents the 
utility that consumers in jurisdiction j attribute to the production of good y outside their 
region. For k = 1, y is a national impure public good: y produces the same level of utility 
irrespective of its geographical location. For k = 0 consumers only care about the quan-
tity produced locally (impure local public good) and for 0 < k < 1 we have a local 
impure public good with spillovers, i.e. consumers derive a higher level of utility from 
the quantity produced in their jurisdiction, but also care about the level produced else-
where (see also Wildasin 2001, 2004). The preferences for the impure public good are 
linear and homogeneous within each local authority, but specific to each of them.6 y can 
be supplied at central level by CG or by an autonomous lower government tier (LG) in 
each jurisdiction. In line with the fiscal federalism theory, y produces a level of utility 
θC = 1 if it is supplied by CG and θL = θ > 1 when it is produced by LG. This classical 
hypothesis in the theory on fiscal federalism (Oates 1972; Tresch 2002) reflects the 
assumption that at local level the preferences for the community can be better matched 
by local supply.7 Finally, we assume that, while the cost to produce the good is p, users 
pay only a fraction pju of such cost. The difference is financed using income taxes at rate 
tj in each jurisdiction.
As in Besley and Coate (2003), we assume that utility is additive in its components and 
that taxation is linear. The use of a linear utility function allows concentrate the analysis 
on efficiency and to rule out distributional issues (Levaggi and Menoncin 2014).
The utility function for a representative individual living in community j is therefore 
written as:
In this paper we take into consideration the problem of CG, that has to decide whether 
to delegate the supply of y to LGs and if so how to implement devolution. The objective 
of CG is to maximise the welfare of the population, defined as the aggregation of indi-
vidual preferences. Asymmetry of information prevents CG to observe z1 and z2; CG 



















6 The use of more general utility functions is presented in Levaggi (2010).
7 For example, let us consider local transport: the same number of bus services produces a different level of utility 






= M(1− tj)+max (αθl − pju; 0)+ zj(θl(Qj + k Q−j)),
l = C or L, j = 1, 2.
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by reducing the user charges pju, j = 1, 2.
The traditional theory on fiscal federalism Oates (1972) postulates that when prefer-
ences are not homogeneous and the goods produced at local level have a higher level 
of utility, CG should always devolve any decision to lower tiers. However, coordination 
problems and information asymmetry may prevent the attainment of this objective when 
the good to be produced is, as in the present case, an impure public good with spillovers.
First Best (FB)
To start with, let us define the solution for an ideal world with perfect information, 
where a benevolent social planner can supply the good of the highest quality, is able 
to observe the local preference parameters z1, z2 and can therefore supply the optimal 
amount of the local public good in each region.
This represents the ideal, FB allocation that will be used as a benchmark to evaluate 
the relative benefits of implementing either a centralised solution or devolution.
Let us examine (2) to understand the problem faced by the regulator. The quantity 
demanded depends on the private utility that each consumer receives from the good, but 
the benefit produced by that commodity also depends on the utility that the community 
as a whole derives from its provision.8 This causes the usual market failure that the liter-
ature on impure public goods has long studied and calls for an intervention of the public 
decision maker (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989). By subsidising y, the regulator reduces 
the user charge pju, and increases demand, so that the optimal equilibrium between the 
benefit (public and private) produced by the good is equal to its marginal cost. If the 
regulator finances a fraction (1− ρj) of p in each region through a (national) linear 
income tax at rate t, the user charge becomes pju = ρj p and from (1) the budget con-
straint is equal to:
The regulator has to find the optimal values of ρ1 and ρ2 for which total welfare in (3) 
is maximised. The optimal solution in terms of price subsidy p(1− ρFBj ), quantities pro-
duced in each region QFBj , total quantity QFB and welfare WFB is presented in Table 1 and 
derived in Appendix 1.
The first line shows the price subsidy the planner should provide. As expected, it 
depends on the utility generated by the public good characteristics, gross of the spillover 
it creates.
The optimal total quantity reflects the three components that characterise the impure 
public good: 1− p
θβ
 is the demand for its private good characteristic, while (1+k)(z1+z2)2β  is 



















8 To understand this point, consider for example the case α = 0: these individuals do not buy y, but as long as zj is non 
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WFB represents the ideal level of welfare, given preferences and resources, but this 
outcome cannot be obtained. CG provision implies that only the good with the low-
est quality (in terms of utility), i.e. θ = 1 is supplied and that at central level z1 and z2 
cannot be observed. On the other hand, LGs produce the goods with highest utility, 
but they do not take spillovers into consideration. CG may influence the decisions of 
lower tiers, but does not have enough information to define an optimal policy. In this 
environment it is necessary to find the second best solution that allows the minimum 
welfare loss with respect to the FB solution. In what follows we will analyse and com-
pare two alternatives:
  • Centralisation. CG produces the less productive variety of y. The quantity is uni-
form across regions and it is set according to estimated preferences for the good;
  • Devolution. CG delegates the production of y to lower government tiers (LG). A 
matching grant (King 1984) is supplied by CG to reduce the negative effects of spill-
overs.
Centralisation
Let’s examine the case where CG produces the goods with lower productivity (θC = 1). 
Since zj cannot be observed, we assume that an expected estimate z is used to determine 
the optimal provision. CG has to set the optimal subsidy that maximises welfare in this 
context. The optimal subsidy and quantities can be found by substituting θ with θC = 1 
and z1 = z2 = z in the formulas in the first two rows of Table  1 and are presented in 
Table 2. The welfare WC is obtained by substituting the optimal user charges pρC1  and 
pρC2  in (3).
Let’s compare the results in Tables 1 and 2. Even when asymmetry of information is 
minimal, e.g. when z1 = z2 = z, the subsidy is lower than in FB: for the quality provided 
at central level the willingness to pay is lower and thus the subsidy. This in turn means 
that the quantity of good produced is not optimal. As a consequence, welfare is not max-
imised and WFB −WC measures the welfare loss.
Devolution
In the previous section we showed that centralised provision does not allow to reach the 
FB allocation; here we consider the alternative solution of devolving production to lower 
tiers that know local preferences and can provide a good that fits best user needs. In this 
section we consider and compare two possible alternatives:






= θ(zj + kz−j), j = 1, 2
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  • “pure devolution” where LGs are solely responsible for the provision of the impure 
public good (the case will be indicated by the letter F);
  • devolution where LGs provide the good, but CG influences their decisions using a 
matching grant.9
Pure devolution
If the goods produced at local level were local public goods, devolution would always 
allow to reach the welfare level of FB (Oates 1972). However, the presence of spillovers 
means that also devolution is a second best option. In this case each Local Government 
(LG) maximises its utility function, but it does not take into account the accrued utility 
experienced by users in other local authorities. As for centralisation, each LG has to find 
the optimal user charge pju = pνj that maximises the aggregate utility of jurisdiction j. 
The subsidy will be financed using a (local) linear income tax at rate tj; the budget con-
straint in this case is
LG has to find the value of νj that maximises the following objective function:
Table  3 shows the results derived in Appendix  2 in terms of the optimal subsidy 
p(1− νFj ), quantities QFj , total quantity QF and total welfare WF.
Comparing Table 1 with Table 3 it is straightforward to see that the two results coin-
cide for k = 0, i.e. when there are no spillovers. In all the other cases, the subsidy is too 
low, total quantity falls short of the optimal level, and the welfare level attained is lower 
than in FB.
This is the first result of our model: the findings of the traditional literature on fiscal 
federalism are valid also for the provision of impure public goods, provided that there 
are no spillovers among regions. In all the other cases, “pure” devolution produces a wel-





9 In the fiscal federalism literature matching grants are transfers from higher to lower government tiers designed to 
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Welfare WC = Y − p+ β+(z1+z2)(1+k)
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Devolution with a matching grant
CG may try to influence the choice of the local subsidy using a matching grant.10 This 
solution has some drawbacks: the asymmetry of information that prevents Central Gov-
ernment from providing the optimal quantity of y may also influence the optimal match-
ing grant setting decision, for two main reasons:
  • coordination problems, fiscal illusion and spillovers: due to the specific characteristics 
of y, any change in Qj affects the level of utility in authority −j and its decision on Q−j. 
The matching grant introduces another interdependence in decisions, because the level 
of local expenditure has an impact on the national tax rate, hence on the welfare of 
each jurisdiction. If local decision makers misperceive the effects of their actions, CG 
may be unable to attain FB, even when it can observe the reaction function of LGs;
  • asymmetry of information: CG cannot observe local preferences parameters and the 
reaction function of each local government.
The environment is characterised by the following assumptions: y is subsidised by LG, 
which does not take into account the spillovers created by its production. CG influences 
the behaviour of LGs using a matching grant.
The timing of the game is as follows: (a) CG sets the grant to maximise total welfare 
using its beliefs on LGs’ behaviour and users’ preferences; (b) LGs set their reaction 
function and their local tax rate.
Although CG cannot observe some relevant parameters, LGs are followers, i.e. we rule 
out the possibility that they may act strategically in setting their reaction function.11 The 
problem can be solved through backward induction: in the first stage LG decisions and 
reactions to a grant setting are considered; in the second stage CG finds the optimal 
grant, given its information set.
The analytical model is presented in Appendix 3. In what follows we discuss the intui-
tion behind the findings.
LG reaction function
LG receives a matching grant at rate (1− ρj)p from CG. If it thinks that the good should 
be further subsidised, it will introduce a supplementary subsidy at rate ηj, to be financed 
10 A matching grant is a form of subsidy to LGs proportional to its expenditure. In other words, the use of a matching 
grant means that a fraction of the total cost for the provision of y is borne by CG.
11 Wildasin (2001) and Köthenbürger (2008) show how local government could play strategically in a game where the 
goods to be produced is a local public good with spillovers.
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by a proportional tax on local income at rate τj. The user charge for the service will be 
equal to p(ρj − ηj). LG decision has a twofold impact on total welfare: on the revenue 
side it will change the national tax rate; on the expenditure side it will alter the quantity 
of the impure public good. This is one of the novel elements of our model: given the 
nature of y, each LG has to foresee the behaviour of the other local authority and should 
take into account the impact of increasing its expenditure. These effects may not be cor-
rectly perceived by LGs. In our model we consider three alternative behaviours for the 
LGs.
(FC) Each LG thinks that the other local authority will replicate the same strategy (full 
coordination—FC), i.e. it will subsidise local production by the same amount. On the 
revenue side the overall change in the national tax rate is taken into account and on the 
expenditure side for each j the quantity Q−j is updated accordingly.
(PC) Each LG thinks that the other local government does not further subsidise the 
good (partial coordination—PC). In this case the quantity Q−j will not change, while a 
one-sided correction of the national tax rate is considered.
(FR) Each LG thinks that the effects of its expenditure on the tax rate are marginal, so 
that its decision influences neither the rate, nor Q (free rider, FR). The latter hypothesis 
may not be reasonable in a model with two local authorities, but in a more general 
context where the number of jurisdictions is fairly large this behaviour may be quite 
plausible. It is interesting to note that this is the hypothesis that has been used by the 
traditional literature in defining grant in the presence of spillovers.
The detailed derivation of the formulas for the local subsidy p ηj is presented in 
Appendix 3 and reported in Table  4. For each LG behaviour two values are reported, 
because a second source of asymmetry of information has to be taken into account. The 
actual subsidy set at local level also depends on the local preferences zj, which cannot 
be observed; as in section “Centralisation” we assume that an estimate z, equal for both 
local authorities is used by CG to guess the subsidy level that will be set by LGs.
From Table 4 we note that the subsidy set by a LG behaving as a FR is higher than that 
in the PC case, as one might expect. A “free rider” behaviour implies that the LG does 
not take into account the increase in the national tax rate that is action is causing, i.e. 
LG underestimate the tax price for good y and will be prepared to subsidise it at a higher 
rate. A more general conclusion cannot be drawn: the relative effects of spillovers and 
national matching grant will determine the result. The use of a matching grant may allow 
CG to improve on pure devolution only if the grant is set correctly, but CG can observe 
only a subset of the parameters. For this reason, it will have to devise a strategy to mini-
mise the negative effects due to the lack of information.
Table 4 Local subsidy in case of devolution with a matching grant
LG behaviour Actual local subsidy Subsidy estimated by CG
FC θzj(1+ k)− p(1− ρj) θz(1+ k)− p(1− ρj)
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Grant setting
In the second stage CG has to set the matching grant, based on his beliefs about the 
behaviour of the LGs and the estimation of the unobservable preferences. We assume 
that CG expects LGs to have the same behaviour (i.e. both are either FC, PC or FR), thus 
the matching grant will be equal for the two regions (i.e. ρ = ρ1 = ρ2). The estimated 
reactions of the LGs (the subsidy in the last column in Table 4) are then used to deter-
mine the welfare function W˜B(ρ) for B=FC,PC,FR using (3). CG has to decide which of 
the LG reaction is more plausible and assigns a probability πB to each of the three pos-
sible reactions; the matching grant ρ will be then found by maximising the expected wel-
fare E(W ) =∑B πBW˜B(ρ). The analytic derivation of the optimal grant in the general 
case is presented in Appendix 3. The solution depends on the probabilities πB; in Table 5 
the optimal subsidies for the following relevant cases are shown: CG believes that LGs 
will behave as either FC, PC or FR (i.e. πB = 1;π−B = 0 for each possible value of B) and 
the case where CG assigns equal probability to each of the behaviours, i.e. πB = 13 for all 
B (the abbreviation “Equi” is used for this case). Note that if LGs act as FC, CG cannot 
influence the expected welfare and no matching grant will be used. For PC the grant 
is twice the size than for FR, as one might expect. Finally, if all the reactions functions 
are taken in consideration with equal weight (Equi) the optimal grant is slightly higher 
than for FR, but quite close. The traditional literature and most actual grant formulae 
use FR assumption to model the behaviour of LGs. FR behaviour has a boosting effect on 
expenditure; by assuming the worst scenario in terms of effects on expenditure, CG tries 
to reduce the negative impacts on its expenditure of LG choices.
Ex-post welfare analysis
Once the grant has been set by CG, the LGs will further subsidise the good following 
the scheme presented in the second column in Table 4. In general, for each case of the 
grant setting, three different reactions of the LGs are possible. The state contingent solu-
tion is presented in Table 8 in Appendix 3. In what follows we examine the results from a 
more qualitative point of view; the discussion will be supported by the graphical visuali-
sation of the main findings.
Let us start by examining the case where CG assumes that LGs reaction is of the “fully 
coordinated” type (FC). It turns out that the difference of the user charge with respect 
to the FB case does not depend on CG grant, which will therefore be set to zero. If the 
action of the LGs is either PC or FR, the outcome of the “pure” devolution case is repli-
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and the welfare difference is:
Note also that, if the reaction of LGs is FC, the outcome does not depend upon the 
action of CG: the total quantity is equal to the one in FB, but if the preferences in the two 
regions differ, it is not correctly distributed among them. In fact the difference in each 
region is k2β (zj − z−j) and this causes a welfare loss with respect to the FB case equal to 
k2θ
2β (z1 − z2)2.
If instead LGs reaction is either PC or FR, CG can reduce the difference in the subsidy 
and total quantity using a matching grant, by an amount that depends on z. If CG beliefs 
are fulfilled, the result is the same in both cases (PC and FR) and, if z = z1+z22  the total 
quantity produced is optimal, while the welfare loss is half the one obtained when LGs 
react as FC. Again, the total quantity is optimal, but its distribution across local authori-
ties is different from FB and the welfare level is lower.
When the reaction of the local authorities is uncertain, the analysis has to be carried 
out by comparing the mean value of the welfare functions. In all cases the term k2θ
β
 can 
be factored out, and the comparison only depends on z, i.e. on the quality of the infor-
mation that CG has on the preferences of the two regions. The analytical comparison 
can be made by standard algebraic calculations; Fig. 1 illustrates the results by showing 
the relative position of the average welfare losses (wrt FB) under the different assump-
tions of CG about the reaction function of LGs. With the exception of the FC case, wel-
fare losses are convex in z. The assumption that LG reacts as PC minimises the welfare 
loss only if CG considerably underestimates the average z¯ = z1+z22  of local preferences (
z < 34 z¯
)
. Let us call WFR and WEqui the ex-post average welfare differences (the last 
column in Table 8) under the two assumptions “FR” and “Equi” of CG on the behaviour 







 then WEqui is the lowest and has a minimum for z = z¯. 
The welfare loss that can be expected using FR performs better for higher values of z and 
has its minimum value for z = 65 z¯.
WEqui increases at a higher rate than WFR as the distance of z from z¯ increases 
because the grant under FR is lower than with the other assumptions. At the left of z¯ the 
grant may be too low to make local authorities react optimally and local preferences are 
underestimated. At the right of z¯ the two effects may offset each other. The two welfare 
losses are equal for z = 1211 z¯; this implies that for values of z lower than or very close to 
the mean, using a grant that minimises the expected welfare loss is preferred to assum-
ing that LGs are free riders. In setting the matching grant, most traditional literature on 
fiscal federalism implicitly or explicitly12 assumes that CG may observe local preference 
on average and sets the grant as if local authorities were free riders. If CG can observe 
the mean of true preferences (i.e. z = z¯), it should use the grant that minimises the wel-
fare loss, but the mistake made using FR is small.
The comparison with the “pure devolution” case is less clearcut: the welfare loss WF 
does not depend on z and in a graphical comparison similar to the one in Fig. 1 it is rep-








12 As in Tresch (2002).
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the preferences in the two regions. If the ratio is not too high, �WF > �WFC and obvi-
ously any solution with a matching grant is preferable. As the ratio gets larger, “pure 
devolution” could anyhow be a viable option only in extreme cases, where either z greatly 
underestimates z¯, or if the magnitude of the two parameters z1 and z2 is extremely differ-
ent.13 Thus, ruling out unrepresentative cases, we can then conclude that a matching 
grant generally improves welfare, i.e. in the presence of spillovers it is optimal for CG to 
induce LGs to change their expenditure patterns using a matching grant.
Centralisation versus devolution
Centralisation correctly takes into account spillovers, but it never allows to reach FB 
because goods produced in centralisation have the lowest quality level (θc = 1). On the 
other hand, devolution has drawbacks in terms of coordination, because LGs are unable 
to take into account the utility that users outside their jurisdiction attaches to their pro-
duction. In the previous section we have shown that “pure devolution” is not optimal: 
CG intervention with a matching grant improves welfare. In this section we compare 
centralisation with this model of devolution. The welfare loss in the centralised decision 
depends on the quality gap (θ) and on the difference between the true preferences for the 
public good (z1 and z2), and the estimate used by CG (z). The one in devolution depends 
on the information CG has on local preference and LG’s reaction to the grant.
Table 6 summarises the welfare losses under the various assumptions. The welfare loss 
for centralisation derives from under-provision and from the lower utility each unit of 
impure public good produces; for devolution the loss derives from the provision of the 
wrong quantity of impure public good. The welfare loss for devolution is zero if k = 0: 
if the goods produces spillovers (k > 0) there might be scope for centralised provision.
The two parameters θ and k are thus fundamental in the comparison between WC , 
the welfare loss for centralisation, and WD, the welfare loss for devolution (the latter 
depends on CG’s information set and we denote it generally by a subscript D). As for the 






3 ≈ 3.732, while WF is lower than the minimum 









Fig. 1 Comparison of the mean welfare loss produced by the matching grant for various levels of z and 
under the different assumptions on the behaviour of LGs
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dependence on θ, the function WC is increasing and convex, while WD is linear in this 
variable; both are quadratic polynomials in k. For WC, an increase in k reduces the loss 
deriving from choosing a uniform level of provision in the two local authorities, but as θ 
increases, the loss caused by producing a goods of relatively lower quality increases. The 
prevailing effect depends on the values of k and θ.
If we assume that CG can observe average local preferences, i.e. z = z1+z22 , the low-
est value for WD is equal to WEqui. In Appendix 4 it is shown that the welfare loss 
increases more rapidly for centralisation than for (the best case of ) devolution. Therefore 
devolution is the best option for any θ whenever WC ≥ WEqui for θ = 1. In all other 
cases there exists a (unique but depending on k) value θ∗ > 1 for which if θ < θ∗ central-
isation performs better than (the best case of ) devolution. The sign of WC ≥ WEqui 
depends on k and the following can be proved (see Appendix 4):
The value of k∗ is shown in (16); the one for θ∗ can be found explicitly, but the expres-
sion is quite cumbersome.
The above analysis has the following economic interpretation: for θ = 1, the welfare 
loss in centralisation is due only to the use of z instead of z1 and z2, which becomes less 
and less important as k increases. At the same time the loss in devolution increases if 
spillovers become important. For sufficiently high values of k centralisation should be 
preferred. On the other hand, for a fixed value of k, an increase in θ has the same effect 
on both welfare losses, but has a comparatively greater effect on WC and this gradually 
(as the spillover increases) offsets the gain produced by a mitigation of the mistake pro-
duced by the uniform distribution of the goods between the two regions.
The dependence of the difference of welfare levels on both k and θ is depicted in Figs. 2 
and 3, while a numerical example is presented in Table 7. In Fig. 2 one can observe that 
as θ increases [i.e. passing from the graph (a–d)] the scope for centralisation gradually 
reduces. In (d) the two welfare losses are depicted for θ > θm, where θm is the value of θ∗ 
for k = 1: in this case devolution always performs better than centralisation. 
if k ≤ k∗ then �WC > �WEqui ∀θ > 1;
if k > k∗ then


�WC < �WEqui 1 ≤ θ < θ∗,
�WC = �WEqui θ = θ∗,
�WC > �WEqui θ > θ
∗,
Table 6 Welfare loss comparison
Regime Expected welfare loss











Devolution with matching grant






(z21 − z1z2 + z22 )+ 310 z[z − (z1 + z2)]
)






(z21 − z1z2 + z22 )+ 14 z[ 56 z − (z1 + z2)]
)
Devolution without matching grant
 Pure devolution �WF = k
2θ
4β
(z21 + z22 )
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From the above results it also follows that the abscissa of the intercept between WC 
and WFR as functions of θ is smaller that θ∗. Thus, assuming that LGs are free riders 
leaves more scope for devolution than what would be optimal.
If CG is able to predict the behaviour, but cannot observe preferences, the minimum 
productivity differential θ∗ for which devolution should be preferred to centralisation 
may be evaluated using the same approach presented above. In this case, given that in 
devolution the reduction in welfare is lower than for the general case, θ∗ will be lower 
than in the model just presented, but there will still be an area in which devolution is not 
the best option.
These results are confirmed by the numerical simulations presented in Table  7. The 
first two simulations shows the effect of the spillover k on the optimal choice for a good 
whose public good component is relatively high. Preferences are rather homogeneous 
a b
c d
Fig. 2 Dependence on k of the welfare losses in centralisation and devolution for z = z¯ for different values of 
θ. For θ = θm the welfare losses in k = 1 are equal. a θ = 1, b 1 < θ < θm, c θ = θm, d θ > θm
Fig. 3 Dependence on θ of the welfare losses in centralisation and devolution for z = z¯ for k < k∗ and k > k∗
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across regions and the quality produced in devolution is substantially higher than in 
centralisation. In this case devolution with a matching grant (Equi) is the second best 
choice, but the loss produced by FR is rather low.
On the contrary, if we consider a case where the quality differential is not important 
and preferences are heterogeneous, the public good aspect is less significant and central-
isation is the best choice. In both cases, k increases the distance between welfare losses.
Conclusions
This paper studies the conditions under which devolution is a second best choice for the 
provision of goods and services are impure public goods with spillovers. Devolution calls for 
coordination in the actions of lower tiers to prevent a failure of the process, even when CG 
observes the relevant parameters and could use a matching grant to internalise spillovers.
In the more general case where CG cannot observe LG’s reaction function and local 
preferences, devolution may cause large welfare losses. Its size depends on the spillo-
vers effect k, on the level of the productivity θ of the goods produced at local level and 
on how well CG can predict the parameters it cannot observe. Our main conclusion is 
that devolution should be used only if the productivity (in terms of utility) of the goods 
produced at local level is sufficiently high to counterbalance the welfare loss produced 
by coordination, asymmetry of information and spillover effects. In all the other cases 
a centralised solution might be more effective. The traditional results of the literature 




Q1 Q2 Q t τ1 τ2 t + τ1 t + τ2 W
Y = 100; p = 80; θ = 1.1; β = 80; z1 = 25; z2 = 35; k = 0.5; z = 30
 FB 33.250 27.750 0.311 0.342 0.653 0.324 0.000 0.000 0.324 0.324 118.828
 C 35.000 35.000 0.301 0.301 0.602 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.271 0.271 112.656
 F 52.500 41.500 0.202 0.264 0.466 0.000 0.111 0.203 0.111 0.203 117.239
 Equi 38.017 38.017 0.284 0.284 0.568 0.112 0.126 0.126 0.238 0.238 118.639
 FR 39.667 39.667 0.275 0.275 0.549 0.091 0.131 0.131 0.222 0.222 118.614
Y = 100; p = 80; θ = 1.1; β = 80; z1 = 25; z2 = 35; k = 0.75; z = 30
 FB 23.625 20.875 0.366 0.381 0.747 0.432 0.000 0.000 0.432 0.432 124.574
 C 27.500 27.500 0.344 0.344 0.688 0.361 0.000 0.000 0.361 0.361 117.227
 F 52.500 41.500 0.202 0.264 0.466 0.000 0.111 0.203 0.111 0.203 120.996
 Equi 30.775 30.775 0.325 0.325 0.650 0.193 0.127 0.127 0.320 0.320 124.148
 FR 33.250 33.250 0.311 0.311 0.622 0.154 0.137 0.137 0.291 0.291 124.090
Y = 100; p = 80; θ = 1.01; β = 80; z1 = 10; z2 = 45; k = 0.5; z = 27.5
 FB 47.175 29.500 0.208 0.317 0.526 0.229 0.000 0.000 0.229 0.229 111.641
 C 38.750 38.750 0.260 0.260 0.520 0.215 0.000 0.000 0.215 0.215 110.635
 F 69.900 34.550 0.067 0.286 0.354 0.000 0.014 0.260 0.014 0.260 109.964
 Equi 59.884 59.884 0.129 0.129 0.259 0.043 0.009 0.009 0.052 0.052 110.595
 FR 61.273 61.273 0.121 0.121 0.242 0.034 0.012 0.012 0.045 0.045 110.575
Y = 100; p = 80; θ = 1.01; β = 80; z1 = 10; z2 = 45; k = 0.75; z = 27.5
 FB 35.813 26.975 0.278 0.333 0.611 0.300 0.000 0.000 0.300 0.300 115.226
 C 31.875 31.875 0.303 0.303 0.606 0.291 0.000 0.000 0.291 0.291 114.475
 F 69.900 34.550 0.067 0.286 0.354 0.000 0.014 0.260 0.014 0.260 111.453
 Equi 54.876 54.876 0.160 0.160 0.321 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.081 112.872
 FR 56.959 56.959 0.148 0.148 0.295 0.061 0.007 0.007 0.068 0.068 112.827
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on fiscal federalism are replicated by our model: for a local public good (k = 0), the FB 
solution is centralisation. In this respect our model can be considered a generalisation 
of the framework proposed by the traditional literature. The second interesting result of 
our model is that CG correction through a matching grant is always welfare improving, 
provided the grant that minimises the expected loss is chosen.
From a policy point of view the results of our model show that in the presence of 
asymmetry of information CG has to balance autonomy with control and it may pre-
fer the former to the latter also for welfare maximisation reasons. When the quality of 
the goods does not depend on the tier that produces it (θ close to 1), but spillovers are 
important (k > k∗), a centralised solution might be optimal in a second best environ-
ment. This is the choice that has been made by some countries like the UK where the 
provision of services like health and education are still very centralised and in general 
it may explain why the level of decentralisation in decision making is lower in Europe 
than in the US.
The work presented in this paper could be extended in several directions: first of all, 
redistribution policies could be considered by introducing a specific income distribution 
at national and local level. This point is very important because the interaction between 
equalisation grants and fiscal federalism may produce perverse effects and it may be one 
of the causes for failures in the fiscal federalism structure such as soft budget constraint 
policies (Breuillé and Vigneault 2010; Levaggi and Menoncin 2013). Secondly, political 
considerations could be introduced by assuming that political parties compete for votes 
on different objectives and in a different setting at national and local level.
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Appendix 1: Outcome of the FB ideal case













































−p+ zjθ + ρjp+ θk z−j
βθ
= 0, j = 1, 2.
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The optimal price subsidy is p(1− ρFBj ) = θ(zj + kz−j); the optimal quantity QFBj  and 
optimal welfare WFB are then derived by substituting ρFB1  and ρFB1  in (1) and in the objec-
tive function in (5).
Appendix 2: Solution of the pure devolution case
The maximisation problem in this case is:
where Q−j is constant with respect to νj. The FOC is






welfare WF is found by substituting the optimal values above in each objective function 
in (6) and summing the results.
Appendix 3: Analysis of devolution with matching grant
LG reaction function
The contribution of the matching grant at rate (1− ρj)p from CG and the supplementary 
local subsidy at rate ηj lower the user charge to the level pju = p(ρj − ηj). CG finances its 
subsidy using a proportional tax at rate t¯, which is derived from the budget constraint 
(4). LG has to finance its subsidy using a proportional tax on local income at rate τj and 
the local budget constraint is:
As discussed in “LG reaction function” section, LG decision has a twofold impact on 
total welfare: it changes the national tax rate and alters the quantity of available impure 
public good. CG has to form a belief on the behaviour of the LGs to estimate their reac-
tion function and we focus our attention on three alternative options:
(FC) every LG thinks that the other local authority sets the same subsidy pηj, presumes 
that the national tax rate grows to: 




























































FC = t + (1− ρj)p2 ηj
βθY
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(PC) each LG thinks that the other local government does not further subsidise the 
good, thus assumes that the quantity Q−j does not depend on ηj and the national tax 
rate is: 
(FR) each LG thinks that the effects of its expenditure on the tax rate are marginal and 
the decision does not influence either the national tax rate, nor Q−j, thus 
In order to reduce useless replications, we introduce some notation to write the opti-
misation problem for a generic LG behaviour in a compact form. For a superscript B, 
ranging in the set of the three different LG behaviours FC, PC and FR, we set sB = 0 for 
B=PC or FR and sFC = 1. Also, we denote by ζj the preference parameter for the public 
good utility of y (so that we can choose ζj = zj when examining the exact reaction func-
tion of the LG and ζj = z when considering the reaction function estimated from CG).
The problem can be rewritten as:
with: m = 2, s = 1 in FC, m = 1, s = 0 in PC and m = 0, s = 0 in FR. The FOC is:
so that the optimal value in non singular cases is given by
Substituting the values for m and s for the three cases we obtain: 
(9)t
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Central Government grant
We assume that CG expects LGs to have the same behaviour and assigns a probability 
πB to each of the three possible reactions (FC, PC and FR). CG will choose a grant ρ 
equal for the two regions so that the expected welfare is maximised. The problem is thus 
written as:
The derivative with respect to ρ is:
If πFR = πPC = 0 (and thus πFC = 1) the welfare does not depend on ρ, i.e. CG can-
not influence the welfare using a matching grant, thus 1− ρ will be set to zero. In all the 
other cases the optimal grant is equal to:
Outcome
The setting of the grant depends on the probabilities πB; in the analysis the four follow-
ing cases will be taken into consideration: CG believes that LGs will behave as either 
FC, PC or FR (i.e. πB = 1;π−B = 0 for each possible value of B) and the case where CG 
assigns equal probability to each of the behaviours, i.e. πB = 13 for all B (the abbreviation 
“Equi” is used for this case).
Once the grant has been set by CG, the LGs will further subsidise the good following 
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and
Since in this notation we have γ FBj = θ(zj + kz−j), for any two couples (γ˜1, γ˜2), (γ¯1, γ¯2) the 
welfare difference can be written as
and the total quantity and welfare differences wrt the FB case amount to:
For each case of the grant setting, three different reactions of the LGs are possible. Ex 
post, the average welfare loss wrt FB is:
where γ Bj = p(1− ρ∗ + ηBj (ρ∗)) is the unit subsidy.
The overall state contingent solution is presented in detail in Table 8. The first column 
reports CG beliefs about LG’s reaction function;14 then for each case in the second column 
are listed the three possible LG behaviours. Reading further from left to right, for each (ex-
post) case (CG belief, LG behaviour) the differences with respect to the FB case of the total 
subsidy γj for region j, the total produced quantity Q and the welfare are shown. Finally, the 
last column presents, for each possible entry of the first column, the mean ex-post welfare 
loss. Lines in bolditalics refer to the case where CG beliefs are fulfilled and the only mis-
take that CG makes is due to its imperfect observation of local preferences. 
Appendix 4: Centralisation versus devolution
From the expression of the welfare WC (Table 2) we have
thus















[γ1(z1 + kz2)+ γ2(z1 + kz2)]










QFB − Q = 1
βθ
(
γ FB1 + γ FB2
2
− γ1 + γ2
2
)














γ Bj − γ FBj
)2
,
14 For example, FC in the first column means that CG thinks that LG will react according to “full coordination” and CG 
will set the grant accordingly.
�WC =W FB −WC
= (θ − 1)
(






+ θ (z1 + kz2)
2 + (z2 + kz1)2
4β
+ z(z − z1 − z2)(1+ k)
2
2β
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and since βθ > p the function WC is strictly increasing and convex in θ.







 whenever z < 611 (z1 + z2) = 1211 z1+z22 .
If CG is able to observe the mean and it can set z = z1+z22 , since k ∈ [0, 1], by standard 
algebraic manipulations we have
The situation remains the same if z = ν z1+z22  for ν ≤ 1211. For higher values of ν, as 





+ z1 + z2
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Table 8 Coordination problem under information asymmetry
CG LG -subsidy -quantity -welfare Ex-post mean welfare loss
 FC FC θk(zj − z−j) 0 k2θ
2β
























 PC FC θk(zj − z−j) 0 k2θ
2β










































 FR FC θk(zj − z−j) 0 k2θ
2β
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 Equi FC θk(zj − z−j) 0 k2θ
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interchanged. Apart from this, unless ν is very large, the considerations done above for 
ν = 1 are still valid in the general case.
From an analytical point of view, it is obvious that devolution is the best option for all 
values of θ whenever WC ≥ WEqui for θ = 1. In all other cases there exists a (unique 
but depending on k) value θ∗ > 1 for which if θ < θ∗ centralisation performs better than 
(the best case of ) devolution. The sign of WC −WEqui for θ = 1 depends in turn on 
the value of k. Since for k = 0 we have �WC > 0 = �WEqui, while for k = 1 it holds 
�WC = 0 < �WEqui, there exists a (unique) value k∗ such that �WC > �WEqui when-
ever k ∈ [0, k∗) and �WC < �WEqui if k ∈ (k∗, 1]. Thus:
The value of k∗ can be found analytically and has the following expression:
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